DUPLICATION OF FUNCTIONS AND LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICTING BILL VERSIONS BETWEEN THE NIGERIAN SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Abstract

Nigeria operates a bicameral legislature which comprises of the Senate as the upper legislative chamber and House of Representatives as the lower legislative chamber. The bicameral design is intended to provide checks between the two chambers on deliberation and to enhance representation. However empirical evidence shows that duplication of functions between the two chambers often result in the passage of conflicting versions of a particular bill which leads to prolonged time being expended during harmonization processes and in some cases results into legislative gridlock. This study therefore empirically investigates duplication of legislative functions and its relationship to legislative gridlock in Nigeria's National Assembly, focusing on the 8th (2015–2019) and 9th (2019–2023) Assemblies. Using a mixed-methods design combining quantitative analysis of 312 bills with qualitative interviews of 12 legislative aides and clerks, the study finds that 47.1% of bills required harmonization, with an average delay of 6.8 months. The study identifies independent committee work, constituency politics, party and regional dynamics, and executive lobbying as primary drivers of conflicting bill versions. Anchored in Veto Players Theory, Bicameralism and Functional Redundancy Theory, and New Institutionalism, the study concludes that gridlock is embedded in institutional rules and norms rather than individual behaviour. Recommendations include the establishment of a Legislative Clearinghouse, mandatory joint committee hearings for bills of national importance, time-bound harmonization deadlines, and constitutional amendments to clarify role differentiation between chambers. The study fills critical empirical, theoretical, and methodological gaps in the literature on Nigerian legislative studies.