THE COMPLEXITIES OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN ADVANCING LEGISLATIVE AUTONOMY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF A MIXED ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Abstract

Parliamentary autonomy as a fulcrum for democratic independence and effectiveness has continued to play important role in the enforcement of the doctrine of checks and balances between the legislature and the other arms of government.Legislative autonomy however as the capacity of Parliament to initiate, amend or reject legislation independent of executive control plays a vital role to democratic accountability. The case study of the United Kingdom presents an asymmetric instance where the election process into the House of Commons is through the First-Past-the-Post process while devolved legislatures adopt the Additional Member System (AMS). Utilizing the framework of Legislative Complexity Theory, Veto Points Theory and the Principal-Agent Theory of Delegation (Strøm et al., 2003) this study empirically examines the extent to which this mixed electoral architecture deepens the legislative autonomy between 2010 and 2024. The study utilized parliamentary division data, select committee reports and statutory instrument records in examining the topic. The findings of the study reveals that “constrained autonomy” at Westminster parliamentary administration. While adoption of the AMS was implicated to increase multi-partyism and committee assertiveness in Scotland and Wales. The adoption of the Westminster’s FPTP electoral system as well as strong party discipline and executive delegation of responsibility through statutory instruments was identified as a key constrain towards the administration of parliamentary independence. The study concludes with policy and research recommendations for strengthening legislative oversight in hybrid Westminster systems.(Tsebelis,2002).