LEGISLATIVE BUDGETARY OVERSIGHT AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, FOCUSING ON ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE: A STUDY OF ABUJA-KADUNA EXPRESSWAY (8TH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 2015–2019)

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between legislative budgetary oversight and national development, focusing on road infrastructure delivery along the Abuja-Kaduna expressway during Nigeria's 8th National Assembly (2015–2019). Anchored on a Governance Accountability Framework (GAF) integrating Agency Theory, Public Choice Theory, and New Institutionalism, the study employs a mixed-methods single case study design combining a 35-item structured questionnaire administered to 85 purposively sampled legislators, ministry officials, contractors, and civil society representatives, ten key informant interviews, and documentary analysis of appropriation records, committee reports, and independent monitoring data. Findings show that the National Assembly's Works committees conducted 17 site visits and 8 public hearings over the study period, yet fewer than 30 per cent of committee recommendations were implemented, and 71.4 per cent of respondents rated follow-up enforcement as rare or absent. Of the ₦56.5 billion appropriated for the expressway's rehabilitation, only approximately ₦32.1 billion (56.8 per cent) was released, a cumulative shortfall of ₦24.4 billion. Developmental outcomes deteriorated across all measured indicators: average travel time rose by 68 per cent, the corridor recorded 1,247 accidents and 423 fatalities, kidnapping incidents exceeded 500, and vehicle operating costs rose by 35 per cent. Regression analysis found that oversight effectiveness explained approximately 31 per cent of variance in developmental outcomes (R² = 0.31, p < .01), with oversight intensity the only significant predictor of fund release rates (β = 0.38, p < .05). The study concludes that Nigeria's formally robust constitutional oversight architecture under Sections 88 and 89 of the 1999 Constitution is substantially attenuated by compounded information asymmetry, rent-seeking behaviour, and path-dependent executive dominance norms, and recommends the establishment of a dedicated legislative Infrastructure Oversight Office, statutory minimum capital release thresholds, mandatory follow-up reporting, expanded civil society monitoring, and an interagency Joint Infrastructure Monitoring Committee.